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[L. A. No. 20585. In Bank. Oct. 1, 194ft] 
REVEREND A. L. BREWER et a1., Respondcnt.q, v. SEC-
OND BAPTIST CHURCH OF LOS ANGELES (a 
Religious Corporation) et aI., Defendants; REVEREND 
J. RAYMOND HENDERSON et aI., Appellants. 
[1] Libel-Privileged Oommunications-Qua.li1ied Privilege.-Ordi-
narily. the common interest of the members of a church in 
church matters is sufiicient to give rise to a qualified privilege 
to communications between members on subjects relating to 
the church's interest. 
[2] Id. - Privileged Communications - QuaWied Privilege. - The 
qualliled privilege applicab,e to communications by persons 
interested is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or 
ill will, or by any cause other than the desire to protect the 
intrrest for the protection of which the privilege is given. 
[8] Id.-Privileged Oommunications-QuaWied Privilege. - Ordi-
narily the quali1l.ed privilege applicable to communications by 
. persons interested is lost if the publisher has no reasonable 
grounds for bt'lieving his statements to be true. 
(4] Id.-Evidence-lI/[alice.-In an action aA'aillst the p:.stor and 
. other officers of a church for libpl, th.! cvidl'nce supported an 
implied finding of thr jury that tht' pastor was motivated by 
a malil!ious or improprr motive in making t.he charbes against 
plllintiffs, whert' a rift dcvl'loped betw!'en the pastor and one 
plnintiff bc,':msr of his failure to accept the ,astor's sugges-
tion as t.o the plnee for purchasing furnishings fo1' the new 
[1] Privill'~c as to communi"ll.tions rt:spccting church matters, 
note, 63 A.L.R. 649. SI'e, Il.lso, 16 Cal.Jur. 67; 33 Am.Jur. 123. 
lIrIcK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Lib!'l, § 30; [2] Libel, § 30(1); 
[4, 5] Libul, § 79; [6] Libel, § 77; [I] Damages, § 211; [R] Lihel, 
§ 3U; [9, 11] ApPl'Il.1 :wd Error, § 1428; [10] Damages, § 13(,. 
) 
792 BREWER tI. SECOND BAPTIST CHURCH [32 C.2d 
rectory, where the pastor refused Lu allow the other plaintiff 
to speak in defense of a membp.r who had been expelled for 
criticizing the pastor's administration, and where, at the meet-
ing at which such plaintiff was expelled, the pastor refused 
to allow plaintiff's son to speak in his father's defense. 
[6] Id.-Evidence-Malice.-Although malice may not bi! inferred 
from thl' fact alone of the communication of a defamatory 
statement (Civ. Code, § 48), the tenor of the statement may be 
evidence of malice. 
[6] Id.-Evidence.-In an action against the pastor and other offi-
cers of a church for libel, it could not be said that the evidence 
was insufficient to support a verdict against defendants other 
than the pastor, where the jury could have in~erred therefrom 
that, in stating that one plaintiff was remov~d from the board 
of trustees because of his vile spirit and disrespect for leader-
ship, defendants exaggerated the cause of his dismissal, that 
defendants lacked reasonable grounds for believing the charges, 
and that in drafting the charges they were carelessly repeat-
ing statements previously made to the congregation by the 
pastor. 
[7] Damages-lnstructions.-In an act:on against the pastor and 
other officers of a church for libel, it was error to instruct 
the jury that plaintiffs were entitled to recover exemplary 
as well as compensatory damages if the jury found that 
the article in question was published wantonly, recklessly 
and with an utter disregar:i as to whether it was true or false, 
sinC9" a plaintiff is never entitled as a matter of right to 
exemplary damages. 
[8] Libel-Damages.-In an action against the pastor and other 
officers of a church for libel, an award of $2,000 general dam-
ages, approved by the trial court on motion for new trial, was 
not excessive in the absence of a showing that the jury was 
influenced by passion or prejudice. 
[9] Appeal-Reversal-New Trial as to Certain Issues.-The ap-
pellate courts have power to order a retrial on a limited issue, 
if that issU(.' can be scparatdy tried without such confusion 
or uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial. 
[10] Damages-Exemplary Damages.-Thc rule that exemplary 
d:lma~lS cannot be imposed unless plaintiff has suffered' actual 
damu!;cs is bused on tht principle that defendant must have 
committed a tortious act before exemplary damages can be 
ass('ssl'd. 
[11] Appeal-Reversal-New Trial as to Certain Issues.-In an 
action for libel, a retrial on the issue of exemplary damll:;es 
against one defendant was ordpred on nppcal wherp th'lt 
issue was separate and distinct from tlwt of actu!)1 dllmnges, 
and where there could be 110 retrial on the issu(' of gcueraldam-
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ages as to IUch defcndant alon~ bco:mso nIl defclldl\llts wtlre 
jointly and leverally liable on the judgment for gcner!ll daJo-
agel. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County . .Alfred L. Bartlett, Judge. Affirmed in pnrt 
and reversed in part. 
Action for damages for libel. Judgment for plaintiff!! 
reversed 88 to one defendant with directions to retry issue 
of exemplary damages; affirmed in other respects. 
, Jerry Giesler, Meyer M. Willner and Thomaa L. Griffith, 
Jr., for Appellants. 
A. Brigham Rose for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In an action for libel, judgment was en-
tered in favor of plaintiffs for a total of $14,000. Both plain-
ti1,Is were members of the Second Baptist Church of Los 
Angeles. Defendant Henderson W88 the pastor of the church i 
defendants Hilton and Hudson were chairman and secretary, 
respectively, of the board of deacons. Exemplary damages 
were sought against defendant Henderson only. The jury 
. returned verdicts in favor of each plaintiff for $2,000 gen-
eral damages against the three defendants and $5,000 ex-
emplary damages against defendant Henderson. 
The publication of the defamatory statements followed a 
oontroversy in the church over the validity of certain elec-
tions to the board of trustees and the board of deacons. 
Reverend Venerable, a member of the church who had been 
recently expelled, brought an action to have these elections 
declared void. His complaint alleged that the chUrch offi-
cials were taking steps to withdraw funds of the church Ilnd 
use them against the will of the members who had been 
wrongfully excluded from the management of the affairs of 
the church. His attorney joined plaintiffs Brewer and Fisher 
as coplaintiffs in that action. A demurrer was sustaint:d to 
Reverend V cn"rable's amendod complaint, and hif: suit was 
di::mli;sed. 'l'hcrenfter, the board of deacons held 1\ meeting, 
which Reverend Henderson attended. 'l'hey d(.'cided to rec-
ommend to the church membership that plaintiffs Brewer 
and Fisher be expelled from the church becam:c of their 
MtiOll ill juiniug with ReVt:!rl'ud V cllernblc in his suit. Do-
fendllllUi Hilton and Hudsun were delegawd by the board 
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to Jraw up charges for prescutation t.o thc church. 'fhe text 
of thc chargcs was left to their discretion. Lctters wcre then 
sent to plaintiffs informing them that ehar1!l'S would be filed 
against them at the next meeting of the church, and request-
ing them to be present. A copy of the charges was enclosed 
with each letter. Defendant Hendcrson testified that he read 
and approved the charges and their transmission to plaintiffs. 
Neither plaintiff appeared at the next meeting of the 
church, when the charges were read to the membership, 
which then voted to withdraw "the hand of fellowship" 
from plaintiffs and expel them from the church. 
These charges read as follows: 
II October 12, 1945. To the membership of the Second 
Baptist Church, Los Angeles, California, we, the Deacon 
Board of the above church, at our regular monthly meeting 
took under ~erious consideration the recent attempt on the 
part of two members of our church, aided by a third, recently 
-...I... dismissed from the church, to bring our church into court. 
On~ of these men was the fu!v. W. A. Venerable, who, be-
cause ofa recent vile attack upon the deacons and minister, 
was dismissed from our fellowship. The other was Rev. A. L. 
Brewer, a non-contributing member, and the other Mr. 
Eu!!,cne Fisher, former trustee, who was put out of office Le-
cause of his vile spirit and utter disrespect for leadership. 
We cnn bring no action against the fu!v. Venerable, who 
undcr the role of a minister of Jesus, is one of Satan's 
choicest tools, because he is not a member of our church. 
If the case had gone to trial this fact would have been brought 
to light. We do hold the other two, Brewer and Fisher 
responsible, and do charge them before the church as follows: 
"We charge that they both complained to the civil authori-
ties that our elections of 1942 of both deacons and trustees 
when we enlarged our board were illegal. The judge ruled 
their complaint false and would not permit trial. 
"We charge that they complained that the officers of 
the church were planning to withdraw church funds from 
the Liberty Savings Loan Company and the Security-First 
National Bank and misuse them, and that the judge ruled 
their complaint false. 
"Wc chargl~ that they amended their complaint to the 
effect that in our business meetings we failed to send written 
notice to each and every member. 1'he judge ruled that they 
were again in error, due to the fact that the church has a 
constitution, which provides, not for a written notice, but 
) 
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for the notice of said meeting's 'Twice on Sunday, morning 
and evening prior to said meeting,' Article 13 section C. 
"We charge that they both in reality admitted their own 
error by reason of the fact that they could not find another 
ground on which to amend their complaint. On the other 
hand, through their lawyer, they offered not to even try to 
umtlnd t;heir complaint, if we, the Second Baptist Church 
would allow them to drop the matter, and we the church 
pny $175 court cost which they would have to pay if they 
lost. We refused to let them drop the case. . 
. "We charge that on September 20th, when they had their 
final opportunity to attempt to amend their complaint and 
try to get us into court trial, not one of the complainants 
appeared in court. This was an open acknowledgement of 
failuro and a clear vindication of the correctness with which 
the business affairs of Second Baptist Church are conducted. 
In consequence of their failure, the attempted effort to em-
barrass the officers, minister, and church was automatically 
dropped, and the judge signed the order compelling them to 
pay to the court the $175 which had already been paid by our 
church. This money will be refunded to Second Baptist 
Church by the complaining parties. 
"We further charge that the action of both of these lUen in 
attempting to bring us before civil authority on grounds of 
proven falsity has hurt the prestige and good name of the 
church, its officers, and minister, because of the widespread 
newspaper publicity given to it. 
"We charge that this attempt to bring the church into 
court has caused us to spend considerable and unnecessary 
funds of the church for attorneys fees which we might have 
used for our church work. 
"We finally charge that both of these men have by their 
unwarranted actions and downright falsehood revealed them-
selves as totally unworthy of the continned confidence, re-
spect, and fellowship of a great church which they have 80 
grievously wronged. 
"We do therefore unanimously recommend that the hand 
of fellowship be withdrawn from them and they both be 
excluded from the church. 
"The Deacon Board of Second Baptist Church, John H. 
Hilton, Chairman, R. A. Hudson, Secretary. " 
A press release reporting the actiun of the church was 
given to the local press, and an article that substantially 
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Natiollal Baptist Voice, a paper of nationwide circulation 
devoted to the affairs of the Baptist Church. This article re-
ported the ouster of plaintiffs Brewer and Fisher and stated 
that their charges against the church had been found false by 
the judge. 
Section 45 of the Civil Code defines libel as "a false and 
unprivileged publication by writing, ... which exposes any 
person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which 
causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a ten-
dency to injure him in his occupation." The charges in this 
case, if false and unprivileged, were libelous. Because of 
their alleged falsehoods plaintiffs were charged with having 
"revealed themselves as totally unworthy of the continued 
confidence, respect, and fellowship of a great church." They. 
were described as persons willing to lie in order to injure 
their church. Plaintiff Fisher was charged with a vile spirit, 
and both plaintiffs were associated with one who "under the 
role of a minister of Jesus, is one of Satan's choicest tools." 
The charges were designed to injure plaintiffs' reputations 
in the church and to cause them to be shunned and avoided. 
The language was aptly chosen for this purpose. 
The evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury's conclud-
ing that the ·charges were false. There was a conflict in the 
evidence as to whether Reverend Venerable's allegations were 
in fact false, and the judge in the Venerable action never 
ruled that they were. The jury could find that neither plain-
tiff authorized his joinder or understood the significance of 
the appearance of his name on the complaint and that neither 
was deliberately bringing false charges against his church. 
Defendants contend, however, that the publication of the 
charges was privileged within the meaning of section 47(3) 
of the Civil Code. Section 47 provides: "A privileged pub-
lication or broadcast is one made . . . 3. In a communica· 
tion, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by 
one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such 
relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable 
ground for supposing the motive for the communication 
innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested 
to give the information." [1] Ordinarily, the common 
interest of the members of a church in church matters is 
sufficient to give rise to a qualified privilege to communica-
tions between members on subjects relating to the church'8 
interest. (Slocinski v. Radwan, 83 N.H. 501 [144 A. 787, 
) 
) 
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63 A.L.R. 643] ; Prosser, Torts, 838; and see cases collected 
in note, 63 A.L.R. 649.) A privilege would exist in this 
case if the publication had been made without malice and the 
occasion had not been abused. Recently in Emde v. Sa-ta 
Joaquin Oounty etc. Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 154 {143 P.~ 
20, 150 A.L.R. 916], this court had occasion to consider tl.t· 
scope of the privilege granted by section 47 (3) of the Civit 
Code. It was there said: "Even greater protection is ac-
corded one who makes a statement, in a reasonable manner 
and for a proper purpose, to persons having a common inter·· 
est with him in the subject matter of the communication. 
when the publication is of a kind reasonably calculated to 
protect or further it. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. 3; 3 Rest., Torts, 
§ 596; Prosser on Torts, § 94, p. 837; see also 3 Rest., Torts, 
§§ 594, 595.) For this conditional privilege extends to false 
statements of fact, although the occasion may be a~used and 
the protection of the privilege lost. by the publisher's lack of 
belief, or of reasonable grounds for belief, in the truth of 
the defamatory matter, by excessive publication, by a publi-
cation of defamatory matter for an improper purpose, or if 
the defamation goes beyond the group interest." [2] Thus 
the privilege is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred 
or ill will toward plaintiff (Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 
164 fIl6 P. 530]: Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 
Cal. 565, 577 [198 P. 1]; Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal. 611, 
618 [213 P. 9541), or by any cause other than the desire to 
protect the interest for the protection of which the privilege 
is given. (See Davis v. Hearst, supra, 164; Prosser, Torts, 
850; Restatement, Torts, § 603.) [3] Although there are 
situations where the protection of the interest involved may 
make it reasonable to report rumors or statements that the 
publisher may even know are false (see Prosser, Torts, 851; 
Restatement, Torts, § 602), ordinarily the privilege is lost 
if defendant has no reasonable grounds for believing bis 
statements to be true. (M~1es v. Rosenthal, 90 Cal.App. 390, 
407 [266 P. 320]; see Emde v. San Joaquin etc. Council, 
supra; Prosser, Torts, 851; Restatement, Torts. § 601.) The 
wisdom of limitations on qualified privileges is well df'mon-
strated by the facts here involved. As a result of the publi-
cation of the charges both plaintiffs were expelled from thf'ir 
church. Plaintiff Fisher had been a member of the board 
of trustees for 25 years. Plaintiff Brewer was an ordained 
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the loss of his membership in the Baptist Ministers Union, 
and the jury could have concluded that he also lost oppor-
tunities to preach in other churches. 
[4] The question then is whether the evidence is sufficient 
to support the implied finding of the jury that dt·fendants 
werl' motivated ,by a malicious or other improper motive or 
pUblished their charges without reasonable grounds for be-
lh'ving them. There is ample evidence in the record to sup-
port thf' inference that Reverend Henderson was motivated 
eithl'r by ill will toward plaintiffs or by a desire to oust any 
mcmbf'rs from the church who would dare to question his 
administration. While plaintiff Fisher was still a trustee, he 
served on a committee to select furnishings for the new rec-
tory. Instead of accepting Reverend Henderson's suggestion 
as to where the furniture should be purchased, he insisted 
that the conu;nittee make an investigation of the furniture 
market. This led defendant Henderson to remark: "I see 
I have got to get rid of you, I can't work with you." By 
the time of the annual meeting of the church in January 
1945, the rift between Reverend Henderson and plaintiff 
Fisher had widened. At that meeting Reverend Henderson 
addressed the church as follows: "Now, E. W. Fisher has 
given me headaches ever since I have been here, and if you 
want me to put this program over you have to give me men 
I can work with." Plaintiff Fisher assigned as the reason 
for the rift his refusal to be a mere "yes man" on the board 
of trustees. At this same meeting 11 member of the church 
raised the question whether there were improperly present 
any nonmembers of the church. After some discussion plain-
tiff Brewer arose and said: "Brother Moderator, I would 
likc to give thc BaptiRt Church position on that." Reverend 
Henderson responded: "Nobody asked you anything about 
the Baptist Church. I have been told you run around here 
with Hiscox Directory and Roberts Rules of Order under 
your arm, the watchdog of the church." Reverend Venerable 
was expelled from the church because he had circulated a 
pamphlet criticizing Reverend Henderson's administration. 
At the meeting where Reverend Venerable was expelled, 
Reverend Henderson refused to allow plaintiff Brewer to 
speak in Reverend Venerable's defense on the ground that 
Reverenrl Brewer was not a member of the church because he 
had not made a regular pledge. At the meeting at which 
plaintiffs were expelled, Reverend Henderson refused to 
) 
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nllow Rcverend Brcwer's son to speak in his father's udell".! 
on the same ~round. He admitted on cross-examination that 
he han \·xumincd the financial list of the church before the 
mf'etinll in anticipation of the . possibility that Revt!ren(l 
Brlm'er's Hon mil!ht want to. speak in his father's behalf. 
Rcvcrend Henderson's attitude toward members who sued 
tht' church is reflected in his statement in the church bulletin 
for May 12, 1946: "Any and aU IDcmbers who dare to sue 
the church will be turned out. They will be kept out as un-
worthy of onr fcllowship. Those who have been excluded need 
not attempt to come back. The peace of the Church must 
not be ullllin nistnrbed by them. Read 1 Cor. 6 :1. 'Dare any 
of you, having ~ matter :~ninst another, go to law before 
thl' unjust, :md not before the saints.' " 
. The jury could conclude that Reverend Henderson had 
developed a stro~g dislike for plaintiffs. They could also 
conclude that Reverend Henderson ~ished to free himself 
of any criticism by expeiling his opponents from the church. 
These facts considered with the language of the opening 
paragraph of the charges read to the church are clearly suffi-
cient to support a finding of a' malicious or improper motive 
for the publication on the part of Reverend Hcnderson. 
[5] In the CaNe of defendants Hilton and Hunson evi-
dt'nr.e of an abuse of privilege may be found on tht' fnce of 
the chargc."I themselves. Althollflh malicc may not bE' in-
ferred from the fact alonl' of the eommunieation of a defama-
tory !;tatement (Civ. Code § 48), the tenor of t.hl' statf'mrnt 
may be evidence of malice. (Davis v. H carst, supra, If.6; 
Siemon v. Finkle, 81tpra, 618; Locke v. Mitckrll, 7 Ca1.2d :'99, 
603 [61 P.2d 922].) "On the subject of actual malice it is 
important to note further that while one may, on a priv-
ileged occasion and without malice, publish to the interested 
persons what may be false, if he honestly believes it to be 
true, he is not by this rule given a license to overdraw, exag-
gerate, or to eolor the facts in his communication. The man-
ner of statement is material upon the question of malice, and 
if the facts believed to be true are exaggerated, overdrawn, 
or colored to the detriment of plaintiff, or are not stated 
fully and fairly with respect to the plaintiff, the court or 
jury may properly consider these circumstances as evidence 
tending to prove actual malice, and they may be sufficient 
for that purpose without otber evidence on the subject." 
(Sn'ivcly v. Record Publishing Co., supra, 578.) 
) 
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[6] All examination of the charges read to the church 
shows that they contained most if not all of the vices con-
denmed in the Snively case. The jury could reasonably con-
clude that in stating that plaintiff Fisher was removed from 
the board of trustees because of his vile spirit and disrespect 
for leadership, dllfendants exaggerated the cause for his dis-
missal. The description of plaintiff Brewer as a noncontribut-
ing member was misleading. Although he made no regular 
pledge to the church, he gave $55 on one occasion and on 
another pledged $150 to the building fund. Furthermore, 
the charges associated plaintiffs with one of Satan'8 choicest 
tools. 
There is evidence also from which the jury could have in-
ferred that defendants lacked reasonable grounds for believ-
ing the charges. This limitation upon qualified privilege is 
particularly a.(>propriatc when, as in this case, a pr~vilege 
is claimed on thc ground that defendants were carrying out 
their duty of investigating misconduct and reporting the 
rl'sults with their recommendations to the church. Defendant 
Hilton admitted that he did not interpret the termination of 
the Vencrable action as "a judicial establishment that the 
charges set forth in the complaint were downright false-
hoods. " The jury could have found that no investigation 
was made by the deacons into the question of the validity of 
the elections, that no attempt was made to learn whether 
plaintiffs were acting in good faith, and that in drafting 
their charges defendants Hilton aita Hudson were carelessly 
repeating statements previously made to the congregation 
by Reverend Henderson. We cannot say, therefore, that the 
evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict against 
defendants Hilton and Hudson. 
[7] Defendant Henderson contends that the following in-
struction on the question of exemplary damages was prejudi-
cially erroneous: 
"You are instructed that, if you should find that the 
article in question was published wantonly, recklessly, and 
with an utter disregard as to whether it was true or false, 
then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover exemplary or puni-
tive damages as well as compcnsatory damages." 
This instruction was clearly erroneous, for a plaintiff is 
never entitled as a matter of right to exemplary damages. 
(Schomberg v. Walker, 132 Cal. 224, 230 [64 P. 290] ; Davis 
v. Heard, supra, 173; Lew'is v. Hayes, 165 Cal. 527, 533 
) 
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[132 P. 1022, Ann.Cas. 1914D 148]; see Clark v. McClurg, 
215 Cal. 279, 282 [9 P.2d 505, 81 A.L.R. 908].) As this court 
stated in Davis v. Hearst and reiterated in Lewis v. Hayes, 
in speaking of an instruction nearly identical with the one in 
question, "The vice of this instruction is that it tells the 
jury that, upon finding malice in fact, the plaintiff is en-
titled, as of right, to an award of punitive damages. A plain-
tiff, upon establishing his case, is always entitled of right to 
compensatory damages. But even after establishing a case 
where punitive damages are permissible, he is never entitled 
to them. The granting or withholding of the award of puni-
tive damages is wholly within the control of the jury, and 
may not legally be influenced by any direction of the court 
that in any case a plaintiff is entitled to them. Upon the 
clearest proof of malice in fact, it is still the exclusive prov-
ince of the jury to say whether or not punitive damages shall 
be awarded. A plaintiff is entitled to such damages only 
after the jury, in the exercise of its untrammeled discretion, 
has made the award." Reverend Henderson was entitled to 
the free exercise of the jury's discretion., This right he was 
denied. 
[8] Defendants contend finally that the general damages 
were excessive. A motion for a new trial on this ground, 
among others, was denied. The question of excessiveness is 
addressed primarily to the discretion of the trial court, and 
an award that stands approved by that court will not be dis-
turbed on appeal unless it appears that the jury was influ-
enced by passion or prejudice. (Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 
181 Cal. 345, 366 [184 P. 672, 12 A.L.R. 1007].) 1!pon the 
record before us we cannot say that the jury was gO influ-
enced. 
[9] The appellate courts have power to order a retrial 
on a limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried with-
out such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a 
denial of a fair trial. (Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin 
Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499 [51 S.Ct. 513, 75 L.Ed. 1188] ; 
see Robinson v. Muir, 151 Cal. 118, 125 [90 P. 521].) Whether 
it can or not depends upon the circumstances of each case. 
The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct 
from that of actual damages, for they are assessed to punish 
the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered 
by the plaintiff. [10] The rule that exemplary damages 
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damages (Clark v. McClury, 215 Cal. 279 [9 P.2d 505, 81 
A.L.R 908J ; Haydel v. Mortun, 8 Cal.App.2d 730 [48 P.2d 
709) is based on the principle that the defendant ruust 
have committed a tortious act before exemplary damage!> 
can be assessed. (See McCormick on Damages, 293.) "Buch 
damages are mere incidents to the cause of action and can 
never constitute the basis thereof." (Clark v. MeClury, 
supra, at 282.) In view of the jury's verdict and the award 
of general damages in this case the commission of a tortious 
act by defendants is established. There is therefore no reason 
for having a second jury determine that issue. 
'l'he rule that exemplary damages must bear a reasonable 
relation to actual damages (Wilkinson v. Singh, 93 Cal.App. 
337, 345 [269 P. 705]; Plotnik v. Rosenberg, 55 Cal.App. 
408, 411 f203 P. 438]) is designed solely to gunrd against 
I:'xcessive pu~itive damages. (McCormick on Damages, SU1)rtl, 
298.) Upon a retrial of the issue of exemplary damages tho 
jury can maintain that reasonable relation between general 
and exemplary damages without having to determine for 
itself the amount of gtlneral damages. The amount of general 
damag-es has been properly determined by the first jury. 
Upon a retrial of the isS1l'e of exemplary damages it is only 
necessary "for the second jury to be advised of the amount of 
general damages already awarded in order that it may main-
tain a reasonable relation between such damages and - the 
exemplary damages, if any, that it awards. If it fails to do 
so and awards excessive exemplary damages, there is an ade-
quate remedy by way of an appropriate motion before the 
trial court or by appeal. 
[11] The jury returned a verdict in favor of each plain-
tiff for $2,000 general damages against the three defendants 
and $5,000 exemplary damages against defendant Henderson. 
All defendants are jointly and severally liable on the judg-
ment for general damages. Since there can be no apportion-
ment of the judgment for general damages, a retrial of the 
issue of general damages as to defendant Henderson would 
require a retrial of that issue as to defendants Hilton and 
Hudson, for otherwise Hilton and Hudson would remain 
jointly and severally liable for general damages, but defend-
ant Henderson would have the benefit of a retrial of that 
issue. 'fo retry the issue of damages as to all defendants, 
however, would nullify the judgment for general damages 
as to defendants Hilton and Hudson, although the judgment 
has been properly entered against them. 
) 
) 
The judgment is reversed insofar as it decrees the recovery 
of the separate sums of $5,000 from Reverend J. R. Hender-
son, and the trial court is directed to retry the issue of 
exemplary damages against him ,only. In all other respects 
the judgment is 8.mrmed. Respondents Fisher and BrewE:r 
are to recover their costs on the appeal of defendants Hilton 
and Hudson. Each side is to bear its own costs on this appeal 
of defendant Henderson. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
